The advisers to the Food and Drug Administration voted 9 to 5 that the potential benefits of the drug, called lorcaserin and developed by Arena Pharmaceuticals, did not outweigh the risks.Let's imagine, for simplicity, that there are two kinds of medical drugs. Drugs that save lives, and drugs that kill people. When pharmaceutical companies test drugs, they gain a signal with error about whether or not that drug is a good drug or a bad drug. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration will then choose the cutoff. If we assume that error to be normally distributed (this is an innocuous assumption: the difference between the sample average and the true signal converges to a normal distribution by Lindeberg-Levy Central Limit Theorem).
The FDA must choose some threshold for a signal, below which they reject all drugs, and above which they accept. They save lives by rejecting bad drugs and accepting good ones. The FDA kills by rejecting good drugs or accepting bad bad drugs. (Corrections is willing to discuss our precise "moral" phrasing, which we posit as accurate).
The FDA can't tell the difference between good drugs and bad drugs beyond the signal they receive. The point, therefore, is what the proper cutoff should be. Whether or not the FDA should be "very cautious" and kill by denial of more good drugs than prevention of bad, or "loose" and kill by allowing more bad drugs than good drugs. The optimal "life saving" diagram is depicted graphically below (click to enlarge).
click to enlarge):
As we can see, because the FDA is risk-averse because of its suboptimal incentive scheme, it ends up, at the margin, killing many more individuals through its denial of live-saving drugs than it saves because of the marginal life saved by limiting a dangerous drug.
Individuals often state that among the first things the government should be doing after protection from coercion internationally through the military and internally through the justice system is setting up systems like the FDA. What is not noted is that the FDA, because of poor incentives, kills many more individuals by withholding drugs than the private market would.
A private system would be optimally incentivized because of the long-term, monopolistically competitive nature of its brand. For those that think this wouldn't be a viable private enterprise, consider the 14 Californian kosher-certification services, or dozens of national certification services. These companies have been successfully serving tiny portions of the United States population for decades. Further, these companies have reason to avoid regulatory capture (unlike the FDA) because they are competing with other companies for consumer's trust (the FDA does not have competition).
If anything, the FDA isn't among the first things government-loving individuals should push for--instead, an altruistic government-loving individual should abolish the FDA to save lives. Any individual with a smidgeon of appreciation for the private market should be chomping at the bit to abolish the FDA and save lives, ease the pain of those denied efficient drugs, save the money of the poor who are denied price-reducing competition, and help improve the lives of individuals who might be benefitted by diet drugs endorsed by almost everyone but an intensely risk-averse FDA.